The recent article by the American economist Stephen Roach, “Yes, the Hong Kong of old is over”, has attracted wide attention and triggered fierce debate. Yes, Hong Kong has witnessed changes— as has any other great city. But that is not the same as saying Hong Kong is finished.

The fundamental flaw in Roach’s argument is not that he sees change, but that he mistakes the end of one stage of socioeconomic development for the end of the city’s value. He treats a particular phase of Hong Kong’s development as if it were Hong Kong’s eternal essence. It was not. It was one chapter in a much longer story of adaptation, reinvention, and functional transformation.

For those involved in cross-border finance, trade, shipping, dispute resolution, and corporate structuring, Hong Kong has never been valuable simply thanks to nostalgia, symbolism, or sentiment. It has been valuable because it performs a practical institutional role that few other places can replicate with the same density and efficiency. Its strengths lie in its ability to connect the Chinese mainland and international markets through a combination of common law, free flow of capital, a freely convertible currency, deep professional services, credible dispute resolution, and commercial familiarity for both mainland and international counterparties.

That is why Hong Kong should not be judged by whether it operates in the way some Western elites prefer. It should be judged by answering a more concrete question: In today’s geopolitical and economic environment, does it still provide distinctive institutional value in cross-border commerce and finance? The answer remains an affirmative yes.

Roach argues that Hong Kong’s recent financial activity depends too heavily on mainland companies, and that this weakens its status as an international financial center. That conclusion is too simplistic. No major financial center exists in isolation from its economic hinterland. New York is inseparable from the depth of the United States economy, the dollar system, and American capital markets. London’s historic role was never detached from its own political and economic base. Hong Kong’s role in serving mainland enterprises, channeling mainland capital, and developing offshore renminbi business does not diminish its international character. On the contrary, it reflects the reality of its strategic position.

The more relevant question is not whether Hong Kong is “more Chinese” than before. It is whether, while being more deeply integrated into national development, the special administrative region still retains institutional strengths that other Chinese cities cannot easily replace. Here too, the answer is clear. Investors and market participants do not choose a jurisdiction because of slogans, nor do they abandon one because of someone else’s nostalgia. They ask practical questions: Can capital move efficiently? Are the rules clear and predictable? Can risks be managed? Can disputes be resolved professionally? Can transactions be structured in ways that international counterparties trust? On these measures, Hong Kong remains highly competitive.

What Hong Kong faces today is therefore not a question of survival, but of repositioning. In the past, it was often seen as the place where the world entered the mainland. Today, it is increasingly becoming the place where the mainland connects with the broader world. That is not a story of decline, but of transition. The old role depended more heavily on Hong Kong’s historical ambiguity and intermediary position. The new one depends more on its professional depth, institutional sophistication, capital-market capacity, and ability to operate under the “one country, two systems” framework as a high-level platform linking the mainland with global markets.

This is precisely why the city remains important to China, and to the wider region. As global supply chains, capital flows and regulatory expectations are being reshaped by geopolitics, national security concerns and economic fragmentation, the need for a trusted, internationally legible and commercially efficient interface has not disappeared. If anything, it has become more important. As long as China remains deeply engaged in global trade and capital flows, there will continue to be demand for a city that can understand both China and the international market, and that can translate between State priorities and commercial logic. Hong Kong is uniquely positioned to perform that role.

I do not suggest that Hong Kong faces no challenges. Questions of talent competition, business confidence in certain sectors, and geopolitical pressure are real and should be addressed seriously. But serious analysis requires more than registering sentiment. It requires distinguishing between the passing of a familiar model and the disappearance of real function.

Hong Kong is entering a new phase, one in which its value will rest less on historical habit and more on its ability to generate institutional, financial and legal value in a changing world. In that sense, what has truly ended is not Hong Kong, but an outdated frame through which some people once understood it. The city’s future lies precisely in not repeating the past.

The author is a member of the Chief Executive’s Policy Unit Expert Group, the Department of Justice Expert Advisory Group on Legal and Dispute Resolution Services, and the Hong Kong Maritime and Port Development Board.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.