Trump 1.0 designated China as a “strategic competitor” that the United States must contain, believing that if China cannot be defeated, “Make America Great Again” will be a mirage. To contain China, Trump 1.0 waged an unprecedentedly fierce trade and technology war against China and seriously damaged bilateral relations. More than a decade ago, the US government and its opposition began to question whether the “engagement” policy for China should be maintained. The voices calling for “disengagement” and even “decoupling” from China have grown obstreperous over time. The succeeding Biden administration not only inherited the “disengagement” policy but also launched the “small yard and high wall” policy, stepping up efforts to curb China’s technological rise.
Trump 2.0’s hostility toward China has only increased, regarding China as the “No 1 strategic adversary”; and containing and isolating China has become the top priority of both US domestic and foreign policy. However, the US has long lost the ability to defeat China militarily. Hence, curbing China’s rise through military action is no longer an option for the US. For this reason, Washington chooses to suppress China in all nonmilitary arenas.
First, Washington lost no time in launching a fierce and unprecedented global tariff war, with China as the primary target. Trump’s wishful thinking was to impose hefty tariffs on Chinese goods to force China to make substantial concessions to the US in economic, trade and financial affairs, and to use tariffs as a weapon to compel other countries to reduce or cut off economic exchanges with China, thereby shifting global industrial and supply chains from China to the US and countries friendly to the US.
Second, Trump 2.0 has intensified his technological blockade against Beijing, such as severely restricting the sale of advanced chips, chip manufacturing software and tools to Beijing by American, foreign and Taiwan-based companies, prohibiting US companies from investing in China’s high-tech companies, preventing US companies from selling advanced aircraft engines to China, banning Chinese companies from investing in US high-tech companies, and implementing global suppression and blockades against Chinese technology giant Huawei.
Third, to contain China in science and technology, Washington has used various threats and attacks on Chinese scholars and scientists in the US, trying to cut off their cooperation with China and prevent the flow of American high-tech to China. It has also attempted to significantly reduce the number of Chinese students studying in the US, notably by limiting the opportunities for them to enter the high-tech departments of top US universities.
Fourth, to focus on dealing with China, Washington explicitly asked its NATO allies, as well as Japan and South Korea, to significantly increase their military spending, thereby reducing their reliance on the US for security and allowing the US to concentrate its military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Fifth, in response to China’s growing influence in the United Nations and other international organizations, Trump 2.0 has attempted to weaken or undermine them through various means, such as withdrawing funding and obstructing their operations.
Sixth, to better contain China and cope with the “China threat”, Trump has even violated international law on national sovereignty and territorial integrity by making territorial claims to other countries such as Canada, Denmark and Panama.
Seventh, to concentrate its efforts on dealing with China, the US intends to reduce its strategic commitments outside the Asia-Pacific region. Soon after Trump 2.0 began, Washington immediately sidelined its European allies and Ukraine to negotiate directly with Russia to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Trump 1.0 succeeded in cajoling several Arab countries to sign a series of Abraham Accords with Israel, thereby promoting the normalization of relations between them and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East. This allowed the US to reduce its military commitment in the region. Trump 2.0 hopes that Saudi Arabia will sign an Abraham Accord with Israel, in an attempt to interrupt the trend of Middle East countries improving relations with China.
Eighth, even if the US dares not to go to war with China, to maintain its military’s “superiority” over China and to “deter” it, the US Congress passed the so-called “big, beautiful bill”, which includes enormous military spending despite an increasingly heavy US national debt and an ever-expanding fiscal deficit.
It’s evident that the “China factor” is highly pronounced in US domestic and foreign affairs. However, objectively speaking, Trump’s various irrational and impractical policies to contain, harm, and isolate China will not make the US great again.
First, since Trump 1.0 launched a trade and technology war against China several years ago, China has strengthened its policies and capabilities in manifold aspects, reducing its dependence on the US, and significantly improving its countervailing power. The tariff and technology war launched by Washington against China this year exposed the US’ serious misjudgment of China’s national strength, its serious underestimation of China’s counterattack capabilities, its serious underrating of the US’ dependence on China, and especially its overestimation of the US’ actual strength. China’s various countermeasures, especially the export control of rare earths and critical minerals, have dealt severe blows to the American economy, particularly to its high-tech and military enterprises. The result is that the US has failed in the tariff and technology war it provoked and has to withdraw most of its sanctions against China in exchange for China’s lifting of some sanctions against the US.
In the long run, even if some countries have to bow to the US, for the sake of their long-term interests, more countries will strengthen economic and trade cooperation with countries other than the US to reduce their dependence on its market. China, with its vast market and development potential, is their first choice for cooperation
Second, China’s victory in the tariff and technology war has greatly encouraged other countries to resist US bullying. Of course, since the US still has a vast domestic market and the US dollar remains a prime international currency, other countries have to make concessions or feign to comply with its demands. Still, they will refuse to sacrifice their fundamental interests excessively and incur internal turmoil. More importantly, compared with the US, China is the primary trading partner of more countries. The Chinese market continues to open to outside players, while the US market is shrinking due to the rise of protectionism and unilateralism. After weighing the pros and cons, most countries in the world are likely to withstand US pressure and maintain economic and trade relations with China. In the long run, even if some countries have to bow to the US, for the sake of their long-term interests, more countries will strengthen economic and trade cooperation with countries other than the US to reduce their dependence on its market. China, with its vast market and development potential, is their first choice for cooperation.
Third, Trump 2.0’s unpredictable, arbitrary, predatory and changing political style has seriously eroded the US’ reputation and credibility, injecting considerable uncertainty into the world. Some American scholars even described the US as a “rogue state”. The US is now suffering from dwindling soft power, making it challenging for it to play a leading role in uniting countries to jointly contain China.
Fourth, the US’ security commitments to other countries are increasingly unreliable. Many countries, including US allies, are strengthening their military capabilities to reduce their dependence on the US, making it increasingly difficult for Washington to dictate to them. This will undoubtedly weaken US hegemony. More countries, especially those surrounding China, will be increasingly eager to strengthen relations with China. China’s relations with other countries will further strengthen, and its circle of friends will expand.
Fifth, dollar hegemony will be increasingly strained because the US is determined to be an adversary of China. To mitigate the risk of a potential financial war by the US, China has accelerated the pace of renminbi internationalization and reduced its reliance on the US dollar. The “big, beautiful” federal budget will significantly increase the US’ debt burden and further explode its fiscal deficit, all despite the gambit of the stablecoin. The tariff war is likely to trigger inflation in the country. These circumstances will erode international confidence in the dollar and weaken dollar hegemony.
Sixth, American society has long been seriously divided. Trump 2.0’s various policies aimed at containing China will exacerbate the polarization of the US, especially since Trump 2.0 betrayed his election promises to the American people, causing vulnerable groups to suffer from inflation and declining living standards. Fierce social divisions and conflicts, as well as the life-and-death struggle between the two major political parties, will sap the country’s vitality and render American democracy an object of ridicule, ultimately castrating the US’ global soft power and leadership.
Ultimately, the US’ reluctance to engage with international organizations and agreements enables China to assume a more prominent leadership role in global governance, promote reform within international organizations, and have its proposals on global development and governance more widely endorsed by other countries, thereby enhancing China’s international reputation and influence.
All in all, Trump 2.0’s decision to prioritize containing China in its domestic and foreign policy will not make America great again but is likely to expedite its decline.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and a consultant to the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
