While Hong Kong is struggling to overcome the health emergency caused by the novel coronavirus, the Macao government is handling the epidemic with ease and grace — which has greatly impressed the people of Hong Kong. Some commentators have said that Macao has outperformed Hong Kong in combating the disease, citing the Hong Kong government’s “relatively slow response” and “poor crisis management”. But this is a simplistic comparison. To have a better understanding of why Macao and Hong Kong have handled the health emergency differently, we can look at the issue from three perspectives. 

First of all, political trust is a critical factor behind Macao’s seemingly relatively prompt response to the virus outbreak. A public health hazard requires the chief executive to mobilize all the political and administrative resources to tackle. For instance, Ho lat-seng, the new chief executive of Macao, decisively announced that the city would temporarily shut down all casinos to control the spread of the virus. Just as Ho said, “For the health of Macao residents, this is a difficult but necessary decision.” We all know that the gambling industry is the lifeblood of the city’s economy, hence it is not a simple administrative decision but a bold move that needs support from the public. It is encouraging that even casino worker unions requested the government shut down gambling facilities. Although casino operators will face a revenue slump, they chose to cooperate with the government, making sacrifices for the greater good. The trust and support given to the Macao government by Macao society distinctly contrasts with the “mutual destruction” mentality embraced by radicals in Hong Kong since the violent campaign began in June. The spirit of “We are in the same boat” is more dominant in Macao — which provides a solid ground for combating the virus.

It is encouraging that even casino worker unions requested the government shut down gambling facilities. Although casino operators will face a revenue slump, they chose to cooperate with the government, making sacrifices for the greater good

Another perspective is the political and governing principle which the two special administrative regions are supposed to adhere to — the executive-led system. Under this principle, the power of the chief executive is much higher than that of the legislature and the judiciary, while the latter two exercise a certain degree of independence in performing the role of checks and balances. Although the exact term is not written in the Basic Law, the articles pertaining to the power of the chief executive endow him or her with the transcendent leadership role in the SAR. This role is extremely critical in effectively handling the current public health emergency. For instance, the face mask panic in Hong Kong will require the chief executive to exercise her full power to control the distribution of face masks to residents. This supreme power of the chief executive has somewhat been encroached in Hong Kong, sapping the government’s ability to ration masks. Unlike in Hong Kong, the transcendent leadership role of the chief executive in Macao remains intact so the Macao SAR government can more readily reach a quick decision and solution. Each Macao resident is allowed to buy a maximum of 10 surgical masks every 10 days at designated pharmacies upon presenting their Macao identity card. In contrast, Hong Kong is restrained by a non-cooperative legislature and handicapped by social unrest. 

Thirdly, we should note how the “one country, two systems” framework has fared in the two SARs. We witnessed a faster and better coordinated response by the Macao SAR government, which implemented decisive measures to suspend visitors from the Chinese mainland and authorized the collection and use of big data in combatting the novel coronavirus. These actions could be taken more readily and easily in Macao simply because the “one country, two systems” political setup is functioning normally there. Macao has demonstrated how a well-functioning “one country, two systems” could help the city better handle a public health emergency. Standing from the perspective of “one country”, Macao residents rationally approached the health challenge, and agreed to control the flow of personnel between Macao and the mainland without harboring any bias or discrimination against mainland residents. In contrast, the “one country” concept is so weak among some Hong Kong residents that politically biased individuals and groups were able to stoke anti-mainland sentiment in Hong Kong by exploiting the novel coronavirus outbreak. Consequently, by correctly interpreting the “two systems” from the “one country” perspective, Macao can rationally restrain cross-boundary personnel exchanges for the sole purpose of containing the spread of the virus. 

The old Chinese proverb “It takes more than one cold day for a river to freeze 3 feet deep” helps put this into perspective. Hong Kong people must recognize the risk of the city going astray in regard to the implementation of “one country, two systems” before it is too late.

The author is research officer of the One Country Two Systems Research Institute. 

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.