Acloser examination of the United Kingdom’s latest so-called “half-yearly report” on Hong Kong reveals a consistent contradiction between its conclusions and what it presents as evidence. Rather than approaching Hong Kong as a complex and evolving jurisdiction that must reconcile competing demands of governance, stability, security, rights and economic development, the report adopts an interpretive framework in which developments are measured against a predetermined narrative of “decline”. As a result, the report frequently substitutes political presuppositions for objective narratives.
The report’s fundamental weakness lies in how it treats the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s high degree of autonomy. It repeatedly alleges that this has been substantially eroded, yet much of its own evidence points in a different direction. The report acknowledges that Hong Kong continues to maintain a separate common law system, independent courts, final adjudication powers, its own financial and monetary institutions, a distinct customs zone, separate immigration arrangements, and extensive participation in international commercial activities. These are not marginal characteristics. They are the principal institutional features that have underpinned Hong Kong’s success over decades. When such foundations remain operational and internationally recognized — as evidenced by a spate of positive global rankings such as the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index — the report’s claim that Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy has effectively disappeared can in no way be sustained.
This inconsistency in narratives becomes more apparent in the discussion of national security legislation. Throughout the document, national security measures are presented primarily as evidence of “political restriction”. Yet every sovereign state, or jurisdiction, maintains laws intended to protect its constitutional order, territorial integrity, and public security. The UK itself has an extensive legislative framework addressing terrorism, espionage, hostile foreign activity, and threats to state security. However, when it comes to Hong Kong, the report conveniently ignores the fact that national security legislation is a normal feature of modern governance globally. Instead, it proceeds from an assumption that such legislation is inherently problematic when enacted or enforced in Hong Kong. This creates glaring double standards that deal a lethal blow to the document’s credibility. When national security legislation is recognized as a legitimate governmental responsibility elsewhere, intellectual consistency requires acknowledging that the same principle applies in Hong Kong.
Equally problematic is the report’s treatment of national security cases. Figures such as Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, Joshua Wong Chi-fung, Chow Hang-tung, Lee Cheuk-yan, and Albert Ho Chun-yan are discussed largely through a political lens, creating a deceptive impression that their prosecutions are primarily contests between authority and dissent. Yet legal systems do not determine guilt or innocence based on defendants’ political beliefs. They operate through evidence, procedure, statutory interpretation, judicial reasoning, and avenues of appeal. The UK report notes extensive judicial proceedings, legal representation, appellate review, and written judgments. These institutional safeguards are hallmarks of legal process. One can disagree with court verdicts, but it is a brutal arbitration for the report’s drafters to transform disagreement with certain verdicts into proof that the legal system is flawed.
A broader conceptual issue concerns the report’s understanding of political legitimacy. The document assumes that certain forms of political activism or opposition naturally represent the public interest; at the same time, measures designed to preserve social order and institutional stability are viewed with suspicion. This biased approach overlooks a reality that is well recognized in comparative political studies: Societies do not pursue freedom, stability, prosperity, and security in isolation from one another. They seek some balance among them. Many Hong Kong residents reasonably regard social harmony, social stability, economic opportunity, effective governance and a robust legal framework as values worth protecting. If only one value, or political preference, enjoys legitimacy while others are manifestations of “repression” — as the UK report suggests — it imposes a narrow ideological framework on a far more complex social reality.
The report also relies heavily on accounts produced by advocacy organizations, foreign governments, and international pressure groups, many of which are known China hawks. Such biased sources deal another lethal blow to the report’s credibility and the drafters’ intellectual and moral integrity. Instead of subjecting those dubious presentations to the same level of scrutiny applied to the policies it fiercely criticizes, the report conveniently treats them as self-validating evidence.
Another revealing contradiction emerges in the report’s treatment of Hong Kong’s economic performance. While describing a supposed “erosion” of openness and confidence, the report simultaneously acknowledges substantial growth in trade between the UK and Hong Kong, as well as the city’s continued strength in financial services, recovery in the capital market, resilient foreign exchange reserves, expansion of mediation and legal services, and continued status as one of the world’s leading financial centers. These developments cannot simply be dismissed as irrelevant. International investors, multinational corporations, financial institutions, and commercial actors make decisions based on assessments of legal certainty, regulatory transparency, and institutional reliability. Their continued engagement with Hong Kong suggests that the city retains strengths that external critics underestimate or overlook — either deliberately or inadvertently.
More than a quarter-century after China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the city’s development must be assessed within the constitutional framework under which it operates rather than through assumptions rooted in a previous era. The persistent tendency to treat Hong Kong as an object of external supervision risks obscuring a basic political reality. China’s sovereignty over its territory does not depend on foreign approval, nor does the HKSAR’s constitutional evolution need to conform to external actors’ preferences. The true measure of Hong Kong’s success lies not in satisfying ideological expectations abroad but in maintaining effective institutions, preserving economic vitality, and securing residents’ welfare.
The author is a solicitor, a Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area lawyer, and a China-appointed attesting officer.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
