The maxim “Whatever doesn’t kill you makes you stronger” draws on the 19th-century work of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Ernest Hemingway later fashioned his version of this saying in the novel A Farewell to Arms, published in 1929.

Any measured consideration of Hong Kong’s history since 1842 affirms the essential wisdom captured in this expression. The extensive writing of the late Leo Goodstadt, including a trilogy of absorbing books, provides a convincing account of why this is so. Goodstadt is exacting in his criticism of Hong Kong governance before and after 1997 but he is equally clear-eyed about the way Hong Kong picked itself up, time and again — often after weathering periods of extreme difficulty (including the horrific Japanese occupation) — to emerge stronger than before and how the resilience of ordinary Hong Kong people provided a central explanation of why this was possible.

A major new challenge for Hong Kong began to develop around a decade after the city returned to China in 1997. Those political groups most antagonistic to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government and Beijing adopted more radical — and reckless — modes of expressing their hostile political stances. The Legislative Council was intentionally rendered increasingly dysfunctional. The most radical elements set the political agenda, and more moderate sections of this movement were deliberately intimidated. The tail was already wagging the dog. Ultimatum politics became dominant. The foundations were laid for the shrill, hugely dislocating and uncompromising “Occupy Central” protests of 2014.

Then came the extremely violent and disruptive “black-clad” political upheaval that commenced in mid-2019. Henry Litton, a former judge of the SAR’s Court of Final Appeal, observed, “There was firm evidence that external hostile forces were behind the movement, fueling and funding the rioters,” concluding: “What Hong Kong faced was an insurgency, the overthrow of the government, nothing less.”

Dialogue and rational discussion were out — fevered demands were in, which then led to the “35+ movement” in 2020 with its 10-point “burn together” project — focused on approaching LegCo elections — to topple the SAR government.

Throughout this period, Western political, financial and media support for disruption within the SAR continued to mount. The mainstream globalized media machine, backing the approved Western narrative, insisted on labeling the insurgency “pro-democracy protests”, no matter how violent and destructive the political rioting became.

The unprecedented “one country, two systems” political template under which Hong Kong had operated since July 1997 had never been more imperiled.

The colossal level of disruption was, however, substantially brought to a reeling halt once Beijing applied a set of radical but measured legal reforms in Hong Kong in 2020 beginning with the application of the new Hong Kong SAR National Security Law (NSL) from June 30, followed later that year by the resolute restructuring of LegCo and its electoral system.

These far-reaching measures unambiguously began to restore basic stability in the SAR. This was the last thing a range of influential Western political leaders, bent on containing the rise of China, wished to see.

Predictably, more strident Western preaching about Hong Kong’s claimed political reform deficit filled the airwaves, and all manner of individual and wider Western sanctions followed. Never mind that the NSL is measurably more protective of human rights and less drastic than similar laws applied across other developed jurisdictions, and that the British successfully ruled Hong Kong minus any Western democratic elements for around 150 years.

Of course, right after the 2019 insurrection, Hong Kong had to deal with the intense COVID-19 pandemic and, more recently, it has been caught in the eye of the trade-war storm unleashed by the United States to try to contain China’s extraordinary development.

The last decade has been exceptionally challenging for the HKSAR. What is now more striking, however, is the way that China’s most international city has begun, over the last five years, to effectively revitalize its long-term prospects — as it has done so many times in the past.

Today, backed by excellent support from Beijing, the HKSAR has an energetically committed government, working as a team within a long-term, China-linked perspective combined with an effective legislature that has put its dismal logjam years behind it.

The challenges facing the HKSAR remain great, but it is progressively working to address them. The long-term project to address the city’s entrenched, low-income housing crisis is advancing more effectively today than at any time over the last several decades. Steady long-term improvements within the healthcare system are now emerging, too, and Hong Kong’s plans to become a global education hub are also being seriously progressed in ways that should create opportunities for partners in the Belt and Road Initiative and for the Global South.

Hong Kong’s rank has recently risen in certain reviews looking at global economic, legal and financial performance, and high-level institutional developments are emerging as well. For example, the International Organization for Mediation announced it was establishing its headquarters in Hong Kong, and a number of Hong Kong universities have risen in the latest Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings, with the University of Hong Kong climbing to 11th place globally.

Meanwhile, the new Kai Tak stadium complex has proved to be a resounding success, and tourism numbers continue to recover. New and returning visitors are discovering for themselves that all those bizarre Western travel warnings about Hong Kong are merely officious eyewash — and sharing their experiences with the world about this on social media.

Many new businesses are also establishing themselves, and hundreds of thousands of highly qualified new residents are moving into the city.

Real difficulties have emerged for food, beverage, retail and other businesses in Hong Kong as a result of the rising, highly competitive attractions across the border, especially in Shenzhen. Adjusting to this new, demanding reality will take time, intelligent reflection and, very likely, a proactive level of government input.

However, these developments have also confirmed how Hong Kong fits within the remarkable Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area — and China generally — and the city is now far more comfortable than ever before. This is positive: The HKSAR’s future is manifestly linked to China and, as Beijing continuously confirms, China’s future lies in the world.

Various elite Western naysayers have been busy, over the last few years, trying to convince the world that Hong Kong is a fading shadow of what it once was. Thus, Stephen Roach, from Yale University (and a former chair of Morgan Stanley Asia), claimed in the Financial Times (FT) in February 2024 that “Hong Kong is over”. By June this year, Mr Roach was no longer emphasizing that Hong Kong was “over”, explaining in the FT that his views had evolved. Sheldon Ray, a letter-writer to the FT soon after argued that “Stephen Roach’s op-ed, My Views on the Future of Hong Kong Have Evolved, contains a typo. It should read: My Views on the Future of Hong Kong Were Wrong.’ ”

Mr Roach may long, in his heart, for some enduring, snap-frozen, Western-controlled version of Hong Kong from several decades ago. The truth, though, is that Hong Kong has always been a city that changes and adapts as new circumstances emerge. It has typically proved to be better at doing this than any other major world city. As it happens, Roach’s recent partial selection of reverse gear indirectly confirms that this is so.

The author is an adjunct professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.