About 10 years ago, while attending a meeting of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, I had an in-depth chat with a former chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Tung Chee-hwa.
What impressed me most during that conversation was that Tung was still bitter about having failed to implement the various reforms he advocated during his first term. He believed that the reforms he proposed were needed for Hong Kong’s long-term development. In his view, the reforms had not been effectively promoted because the HKSAR government had failed to launch extensive publicity on the reform proposals to canvass mass support, causing many people to doubt the goals and effectiveness of the reforms. The lack of understanding, or worse, the misunderstanding, of their effectiveness triggered strong voices and actions against the reforms.
Tung’s experience attests to the fact that promoting major reforms in Hong Kong will inevitably be met with considerable skepticism, difficulties and obstacles. Undoubtedly, Tung is a thoughtful and farsighted strategic thinker. Before becoming the chief executive, he realized that even if the Basic Law promised to keep Hong Kong’s original capitalist system and way of life unchanged, it still needed significant reforms. Otherwise, the city’s economy would struggle to sustain growth, and there would be insufficient development opportunities for young people. Social stability could not be guaranteed either. He believed that Hong Kong’s industrial base was too narrow and that the city could not rely on finance, real estate and other traditional industries alone to maintain its long-term prosperity. At the same time, the housing shortage and exorbitant housing prices were detrimental to improving people’s livelihoods and social stability. Therefore, after taking office, he proposed cultivating new industries, such as the innovation and technology sector and the traditional Chinese medicine industry, under the leadership of a proactive government. This vision of a diversified and optimized industrial landscape for Hong Kong promised a more robust and resilient economy. He also proposed a housing policy to build 85,000 residential units yearly to solve Hong Kong’s housing problem. However, his grand plan soon ran into trouble and became a regret for him.
Simply put, Tung’s ambitious reform plan was “untimely”. At the beginning of the establishment of the HKSAR, the unprecedented Asian financial crisis suddenly broke out, triggering the bursting of Hong Kong’s real estate bubble, the plunge in property prices and the collapse of the economy. The government’s financial situation was so bad that it had to sell off government assets and cut civil servants’ salaries for emergency relief. The ensuing avian-flu epidemic worsened Hong Kong’s situation. Pessimism pervaded Hong Kong society. Many people were resentful and distrustful of the SAR government, and the anti-China insurrectionist forces in Hong Kong took the opportunity to attack the government wantonly. The central government refrained from actively supporting Tung’s reforms for fear of being criticized by hostile forces as undermining Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. Although reforms back then were necessary, many officials and Hong Kong society still believed that Hong Kong’s established systems and policies were the “magic weapon” that Hong Kong could still rely on for future success. Many people were worried that Tung’s reforms would have counterproductive or self-defeating effects. There was little public confidence in the government’s capabilities and meager support for reform. In that unfavorable political and economic environment, promoting large-scale reforms was not easy.
Today, Hong Kong, like the country, is facing “great changes unseen in a century” and urgently needs to promote large-scale reforms to survive and develop. The central government expects that Hong Kong will boldly and innovatively advance reforms. In his recent Policy Address, Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu proactively responded to the central government’s call and mentioned reforms more than 40 times, underscoring the need to “continuously seek change and self-innovation”. Compared with Tung’s era, Hong Kong today has a more auspicious political milieu for undertaking reforms. In particular, the sense of anxiety among many Hong Kong residents has increased discernibly. The insurrectionist forces that often set up obstacles to reforms in the past have been crushed, and, under the configuration of “patriots administering Hong Kong”, the SAR government’s reform efforts will be appreciated by the Legislative Council and supported by the central government, which is particularly critical, and the central government will also provide firm and practical support to the SAR government’s reform work. Even so, reform will still be a difficult task. After decades of development, Hong Kong has become a mature and highly modern society. According to American scholar Mancur Olson’s theory, a relatively stable society would have inevitably spawned numerous interest groups, which will push the government to formulate policies and modify institutions and laws to protect their interests. Consequently, increasingly complex and elaborate institutions and laws would constitute a stumbling block to reform. Reforming institutions, amending laws and enacting new laws will inevitably encounter strident opposition from vested interests. If the SAR government wants to implement reforms, it will inevitably encounter resistance and sabotage from vested interests, including public officials. In addition, in the foreseeable future, Hong Kong’s economy and the government’s financial situation are expected to remain quite tricky, which are likely to be exacerbated by geopolitical conflicts.
Since Hong Kong must move toward the reform path of no return, with Lee stressing that “reform can only be carried out without end”, Tung’s experiences and lessons from his “unfinished business” of reform should be well-learned to guide future efforts on creating favorable conditions for reforms and removing obstacles.
First, the government must formulate a clear reform blueprint, determine major reform projects, explain the necessity and effectiveness of reform, outline the timetables and road maps, and indicate the required resources from the public and private sectors. The difficulties expected to be encountered and overcome in the reforms must be spelled out. The reform blueprint must come from top-level design, be charted by a top body responsible for reforms, require cross-departmental collaboration and social cooperation, and be equipped with professionals from within the government and society. The blueprint will inevitably involve long-term and macro planning, which must relate to the country’s five-year plans. In other words, the SAR government must have strong policy research, strategic thinking, and the ability to coordinate reforms.
Second, any significant reform generally demands the efforts of the entire government, close collaboration between policy and executive departments, and a considerable expenditure of resources, and takes time to achieve. Therefore, strategic focus, patience and perseverance are crucial. Considering the limited public resources, social affordability, political feasibility and obstruction from vested interests, the government should act prudently at any time and avoid doing everything at once or in haste. It should focus only on a few reform projects at any given time and set priorities. Those reform projects must achieve a “point-to-area” effect, choosing only those reforms that can promote Hong Kong’s multifaceted development with significant effects. At present, relatively major reforms are inevitably closely related to the government’s fiscal policy, especially tax policy, as well as financial, land, industrial, and talent policies.
Third, as Tung’s experience reveals, when the government is planning significant reforms, in addition to conducting rigorous policy research, it must brainstorm with the central government and all sectors of society to ensure that the reform proposals can cater to and reconcile the interests of all parties and win over most elites. Support from influential public figures should be sought, and the resistance of various opposition forces should be overcome. After the reform proposals are released, the government must work with the forces supporting the reform in society to vigorously publicize and mobilize the support of most residents, thereby forming a substantial pro-reform coalition and reducing the strength of the forces that resist reform.
Fourth, the proposed reforms must win the support of the central government. . In accelerating its integration into the country’s overall development, Hong Kong’s cooperation with the Chinese mainland, especially the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, has become increasingly close and indispensable. The central government’s policy toward Hong Kong is crucial to its development. The success or failure of many reforms is closely related to the central government’s understanding and support. Hong Kong must discuss and collaborate with the central government to develop a reform plan. It would be best if Hong Kong’s reforms benefit itself and the country.
Fifth, strong support for reform within the SAR government is essential. Today, although many public officials recognize the need for reform, some still doubt it or worry that they lack the knowledge and abilities required for reform. After all, reform means an increase in the government’s economic and social responsibilities and functions, which will inevitably increase the workload of public officials and tax their abilities. It is difficult for the government to upgrade its workforce significantly under financial constraints. In any case, the government’s leadership team must fully recognize the imperative to reform, support it wholeheartedly, work together to implement it, and ensure that various government departments complete various reform tasks dutifully and effectively. When Tung became the second-term chief executive in 2002, he introduced the accountability system for principal officials. One of the reasons was that during his first term, except for the secretary for justice, all members of his leadership team were originally from the senior civil servants serving in the British Hong Kong government. Some of them did not agree with Tung on reform issues. Tung hoped to form a leadership group conducive to reform through the political appointment of principal officials in his leadership team. Today, to strengthen the government’s ability to undertake reforms, despite the financial difficulties the government faces, it still needs to recruit knowledgeable and experienced professionals from society into the top echelons of the government.
Sixth, in promoting reform, the government must work closely with all sectors of society. This is not only to allow people in society to be called participants and stakeholders in the reform but also to win over business and social groups with the money and influence to support, supplement or complement the government in implementing the reform. Even if the government’s financial situation improves in the future, it is estimated that its financial capacity will still be insufficient to meet reform needs. Therefore, mobilizing social resources wisely and vigorously is crucial. The government and society working together to promote reforms to promote Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity, stability, and development will also help enhance the unity of Hong Kong society, strengthen Hong Kong’s ability to cope with difficulties and challenges, and bolster the ties between the government and the people.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a consultant for the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
