Tie-ups on common interests usher in calm

The Asia-Pacific region has long been the theater for power plays on the world stage. It was once dubbed the hotbed of rising nationalism in defiance of colonialism after World War II as it saw the emergence of many new sovereign states. Since then, it has evolved into a region of dynamic economic growth, defined by multilateral cooperation, providing a successful model for regional economic integration.

Yet, beyond the robust trade, the unsettled overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea remain potential powder kegs in the region. The saber-rattling of warships on the high seas purportedly in defense of “freedom of navigation” reminds the world of the intensifying great-power rivalry in disputed waters.

The South China Sea disputes have consistently been used as a convenient justification for the so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) that purportedly aim to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation and overflight, as recognized under international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). That being said, the truth remains that navigational rights and freedom of access to overflights over the disputed waters have never been denied or impeded by the contending parties, albeit the disputes linger on.

The assertion of such uncontended rights by the United States-led West through FONOPs in the name of supporting a free and open “Indo-Pacific” is nothing but a lame justification for non-stakeholders to contest and interfere in the overlapping territorial claims and maritime entitlements in the region.

The provocative acts of Western powers are visibly targeting China. 

Despite its rhetoric of upholding a rules-based order, the US has never been a party to UNCLOS.

What appears more baffling than ever before is the recent calls by the Donald Trump administration for countries in Asia-Pacific, notably its allies, to increase their military spending to 5 percent of their respective GDPs. At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth minced no words in making such demands purportedly to reorient “toward deterring aggression by China”. The message he conveyed is unambiguously provocative, way beyond the limit of strategic deterrence that the Pentagon has been espousing.

The new Pentagon chief’s condescending spiel sounds more like promoting the interests of the US military-industrial complex than addressing the security concerns in the region. In pushing 5 percent of GDP across the board, the Trump administration might not be aware that such a quantum leap of military spending for allies is tantamount to diverting resources these countries need to improve their critical infrastructure and the well-being of their people.

It is burdensome for the region, particularly when the Asia-Pacific is navigating a wide gamut of non-traditional insecurities with limited resources of wherewithal and expertise. Rising security risks, ranging from food and energy security to public health crises, the climate exigency, cross-border terrorism, illicit drugs, and human trafficking — to cite just a few — are now ringing the alarm for timely intervention from stakeholders, although the construction of a viable security architecture for the region is yet to be seen.

In this regard, the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), alongside its eight dialogue partners, are not short of mechanisms for multilateral cooperation and engagement.

Under the framework of ASEAN Centrality, the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus are ready platforms for regional engagement on traditional security concerns.

More specifically, the enduring China-ASEAN partnership, which forms the backbone of China-ASEAN economic cooperation, could also be extended to cover more dimensions of collaboration. Alongside the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese global initiatives dedicated to spearheading sustainable development and addressing security concerns, namely the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, make ideal tools for ASEAN and its dialogue partners to navigate the pressing challenges.

The bloc’s predicament lies in its straddling the Sino-US face-off. It is no secret that ASEAN embraces Beijing in pursuit of its collective economic interests. China has been the top trading partner of ASEAN since 2009, while both have been each other’s largest trading partner since 2020. Yet, the US, being widely viewed as the traditional security provider across the Asia-Pacific, still bafflingly captures the imagination of certain state actors in ASEAN, who call for the renewed military presence of Washington in the neighborhood to counter the “growing military clout” of China.

Of all its official dialogue partners, ASEAN has the largest number of cooperation mechanisms with China, accounting for almost 20 percent of the total collaborative frameworks that ASEAN has had with its 11 official dialogue partners over the years.

In this context, any misgiving within ASEAN against purported over-dependency on China for fear of invoking the wrath of the US-led West is absolutely unnecessary, if not over-cautious. The US, being the comprehensive strategic partner of ASEAN, has all the necessary convenience to reach out to ASEAN for deeper collaboration.

In mitigating the arising security concerns, Washington appears more inclined to foster defense-oriented mini-laterals comprising “like-minded” countries, a euphemism for ideologically friendly countries from the Western perspective, in the Asia-Pacific. Mini-lateral groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the AUKUS trilateral security partnership — among the US, the United Kingdom, and Australia — are clear footprints of Washington beefing up its strategic deterrence architecture in the region.

Both the US-led mini-laterals, alongside the trilaterals and bilaterals involving allies such as Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines, serve the purpose of safeguarding US interests in the Asia-Pacific by targeting China.

In the case of the China-ASEAN partnership, more mini-laterals similar to the China-driven Mekong-Lancang Cooperation could be commissioned to address the various exigencies. Alongside China, ASEAN member states with shared priorities could seek to coalesce in pursuit of concerted strategies for mitigating the rising insecurities.

Under such circumstances, China can partner with ASEAN member states and others with shared priorities, through mini-laterals in its bid to navigate the common security challenges. These would provide a good platform for China to prove the worth of its Global Security Initiative, which needs to be better understood by stakeholder countries in the region. Alongside this, mini-laterals would also act as cradles for nurturing political trust, which will diminish suspicion and help endear China to its neighbors.

The author is president of the Belt and Road Initiative Caucus for Asia Pacific. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. 

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.