The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime corridor linking the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea, remains one of the most critical chokepoints in global trade. More than 20 percent of the world’s crude oil and a substantial volume of liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit through this passage.
Any disruption — whether caused by military conflict, blockade, or broader geopolitical escalation — would have profound implications, particularly for energy-dependent Asian economies.
For countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and India, the strait is not merely a conduit for trade — it is an essential artery for energy security. A sudden halt in energy supplies from the Gulf could push oil prices beyond $150–200 per barrel, unleashing inflationary pressures across the region.
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With post-pandemic recoveries still fragile and currencies under stress, most Asian economies are ill-prepared to absorb a sustained energy shock. The timing of this crisis could not be worse for Asia.
East Asia is acutely vulnerable. China, Japan, and South Korea rely on the strait for the bulk of their energy imports. Even a temporary closure during peak demand months could disrupt manufacturing output and escalate fuel and food prices.
For emerging economies such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, which depend heavily on Qatari LNG and lack strategic reserves or diversified suppliers, the fallout could be destabilizing. Both countries are already navigating political volatility, rendering them particularly susceptible to external shocks.
The implications of a Strait of Hormuz crisis extend far beyond energy markets. Shipping delays, elevated insurance premiums, and rerouted supply chains would raise the cost of goods moving between the Gulf and Asia.
Essential commodities such as petrochemicals, fertilizers, and staple food items would see price spikes, threatening food security and intensifying fiscal pressures in lower- and middle-income Asian countries.
Strategically, the crisis underscores Asia’s maritime vulnerabilities and highlights the urgent need for resilient energy infrastructure. For Beijing, it serves as a timely reminder of the importance of securing stable and diversified energy supply routes.
In response, China is likely to accelerate the development of overland energy corridors through Central Asia and broaden its energy partnerships. When pursued in close cooperation with other regional countries, these initiatives hold the potential to significantly enhance energy security, improve regional connectivity, and foster deeper economic integration across Asia.
India, despite its geographic proximity to the Gulf, remains similarly exposed. A majority of India’s oil imports pass through the strait. New Delhi is thus likely to strengthen its naval presence in the Arabian Sea, expand strategic petroleum reserves, and intensify its energy diplomacy with energy-producing countries.
The crisis could also accelerate India’s diversification strategy — both geographically through partnerships with Africa and Latin America, and technologically via investments in renewable energy and cleaner fuels.
Diplomatically, India faces a complex balancing act. Its strategic ties with Teheran, Tel Aviv, and Washington demand a carefully calibrated response. Any visible tilt could compromise New Delhi’s strategic autonomy or disrupt vital energy partnerships. India is expected to maintain its traditional posture of nonaligned diplomacy, while quietly enhancing its maritime reach across the Indian Ocean.
A deeper US–Iran confrontation would likely intensify regional polarization. US allies such as Japan and South Korea could face calls to contribute militarily or financially to Gulf operations. However, such expectations may encounter political resistance at home.
In South Korea, for instance, newly elected President Lee Jae-myung’s more balanced foreign policy makes overt military alignment with the US less likely. Additionally, renewed burden-sharing debates — especially involving financial contributions to maritime security — could strain public support and weaken alliance cohesion in both Tokyo and Seoul.
The crisis may also foster convergence among BRICS members, notably China, Russia, and India. These countries share a strategic interest in limiting unilateral control over Gulf maritime routes. This could give rise to alternative energy governance models, non-dollar oil trade mechanisms, or even joint naval exercises, challenging the traditional US-led regional security architecture.
Still, Asia is not entirely unprepared. Several Asian powers have made notable efforts to improve energy resilience.
China has expanded its strategic reserves, diversified supply routes, and invested heavily in renewables. India has broadened its crude sources and upgraded its refining capacity. Japan and South Korea continue to lead in next-generation energy technologies, including hydrogen and nuclear power, while maintaining significant oil stockpiles.
Nonetheless, smaller nations remain gravely at risk. Countries like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan lack the financial and logistical capabilities to withstand sustained energy disruptions. Their political and economic systems could buckle under prolonged pressure.
Regional development institutions such as the Asian Development Bank must be prepared to offer emergency energy support and liquidity injections to stabilize these fragile economies.
The potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not just a regional emergency — it is a systemic threat to Asia’s economic stability and strategic cohesion. The unfolding crisis will test the region’s ability to navigate intensifying global polarization while safeguarding energy access and national security.
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As geopolitical tensions mount, Asian leaders must act with urgency and clarity — prioritizing both short-term energy security and long-term regional resilience.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis may well become a defining test of Asia’s strategic maturity. The time for regional unity and proactive Asian leadership has arrived.
The author is director of peace and security studies at The Asia Institute, a think tank in South Korea.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.