Last month, I attended a consultation session organized by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC). Paul Lam Ting-Kwok, Secretary for Justice Paul Lam Ting-Kwok, and Secretary for Security Chris Tang Ping-Keung were invited to speak on the proposed Article 23 legislation, which has just been tabled today for deliberation in the Legislative Council. More than 100 members of the HKGCC were in attendance, some of them being representatives of chambers of commerce from foreign countries. Lam and Tang delivered concise and unambiguous explanations of the most crucial elements of the draft legislation. The audience was satisfied with the proposed national security law, albeit some of them raised concerns about specific definitions that may need further clarification.

Indeed, so far, Hong Kong society, by and large, has responded to the proposed legislation rationally  and with empathy. This is quite different from what happened in 2003 when the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government endeavored to enact similar legislation under Article 23 for the first time. As we all recall, at the instigation of anti-China media and political activists and orchestrated by self-claimed pro-democracy politicians, many people opposed the proposed Article 23 legislation fiercely then. Half a million people took to the streets of Hong Kong Island on July 1 that year to protest the proposed legislation. As a matter of fact, in the first few years after 1997, national security threats were, in many people’s eyes, nonexistent. They did not believe there would be substantial secessionist or subversive elements in Hong Kong. Amid an economic downturn, a combined result of the real estate market’s collapse since 1998 and government departments’ mishandling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic in 2003, Hong Kong residents’ mood was rather one-sided. The Article 23 legislation was accordingly shelved as not many people at the time regarded the issue of national security as pressing.

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Fast-forward to 2019, and Hong Kong suddenly encountered an unprecedented national security crisis. For almost one whole year, street riots broke out, and black-clad protesters hurled Molotov cocktails at police officers, police stations, MTR stations, banks, and shops that they believed to be owned by the Chinese mainland or whose owners were believed to be “pro-Beijing”. Traffic lights, railings, pavements, many government facilities and even the central government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong were vandalized. We also witnessed, in horror, the rioters’ siege of Hong Kong International Airport, the outrageous storming of the Legislative Council, and extreme violence perpetrated on two university campuses. Hong Kong was close to anarchy. At several rallies, protesters carried Stars and Stripes flags of the United States, and Union Jack flags of the United Kingdom. On some banners, they shamelessly urged the US to “liberate” Hong Kong and begged the British government to “take back” the HKSAR from China. The theme of the protests was quite clear: to separate Hong Kong from China, which was a challenge to China’s sovereignty, and amounted to acts of treason.

In 2019 and 2020, there were also ample examples showing national security was under serious threat at a much higher level. Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, boss of the now-defunct tabloid newspaper Apple Daily and a long-time anti-China businessman and political activist, went to the US more than once, meeting high-ranking US officials and requesting the US government to sanction the Chinese central and HKSAR governments and their officials. He made it unequivocally clear in one interview with the US media that he aims to defeat China and bring down the CCP. He even reminded the American leadership that nuclear weapons could be used against China to achieve the objectives. Apart from Lai, anti-China politicians such as Anson Chan Fang On-sang, Martin Lee Chu-min, Dennis Kwok Wing-hang, and student activist Joshua Wong Chi-fung had also openly lobbied the US government to put pressure on Beijing and the HKSAR government. Such blatant acts of colluding with foreign forces would never be allowed anywhere else in the world.

A few days ago, 17 young defendants appeared in the High Court for a criminal trial. The offenses they were charged with included terrorism, conspiracy to plot to murder police officers, possession of explosives, and possession of firearms and ammunition,, and all were related to a march planned by the anti-government protesters in December 2019. One of them, who was 18 years old at the time, was subdued when he fired a shot at the police officer arresting him. One would inevitably wonder how these youngsters, many of them students, could have access to such a weapon. Another question that we should ask is: Who provided military training to these radical political activists? The absence of a national security law at the time was probably the main reason subversive forces were rampant.

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The central government adopted a relaxed approach when the Basic Law, a constitutional document laying the foundation for the establishment of HKSAR, was drafted more than three decades ago. The HKSAR was given the liberty to enact appropriate legislation to safeguard national security at an appropriate time. Article 23 of the Basic Law stipulates that the HKSAR shall enact a suitable national security law to prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the central government, or theft of State secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the HKSAR, and to prohibit political bodies in the HKSAR from building ties with foreign political organizations or bodies. Twenty-six years have passed since HKSAR was established. Given the national security crises we have faced in recent years, this crucial constitutional exercise must be completed without further delay. Enacting a local version of national security law per Article 23 is the final piece of the puzzle.

The author is a solicitor and senior partner of a Hong Kong law firm and a Greater Bay Area lawyer.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.